We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are selected. proposed two representation axioms called justified representation and extended justified representation. Whereas the former can be tested as well as achieved in polynomial time, the latter property is coNP-complete to test and no polynomial-time algorithm is known to achieve it. Interestingly, proposed an intermediate property called proportional justified representation that admits a polynomial-time algorithm to achieve. The complexity of testing proportional justified representation has remained an open problem. In this paper, we settle the complexity by proving that testing proportional justified representation is coNP-complete. We complement the complexity result by showing that the problem admits efficient algorithms if any of the following parameters are bounded: (1) number of voters (2) number of candidates (3) maximum number of candidates approved by a voter (4) maximum number of voters approving a given candidate.
Introduction
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target k number of candidates are selected. The setting has been referred to as approval-based multiwinner voting or committee voting with approvals. The setting has inspired a number of natural voting rules [8, 5, 9, 3, 13] . Many of the voting rules attempt to satisfy some notion of representation. However it has been far from clear what axiom capture the representation requirements.
Aziz et al. [1, 2] 
proposed two compelling representation axioms called justified representation (JR) and extended justified representation (EJR).
Whereas the former can be tested as well as achieved in polynomial time, the latter property is coNP-complete to test and no polynomial-time algorithm is known to achieve it. Interestingly, Sánchez-Fernández et al. [11] proposed an intermediate property called proportional justified representation (PJR) that admits a polynomial-time algorithm to achieve. The idea behind all the three properties is that a cohesive and large enough group deserves sufficient number of approved candidates in the winning set of candidates. Sánchez-Fernández et al. [11] argued that although EJR is a stronger property than PJR, PJR is more reasonable because it is compatible with a property called perfect representation.
Proportional justified representation (PJR) has been examined in subsequent papers [6, 12, 10] . Despite the flurry of work on the property, the complexity of testing proportional justified representation has remained an open problem. Sánchez-Fernández et al. [10] 1 The problem is especially important if one wants to test whether a status quo outcome or the outcome of some other rule or negotiation process satisfies PJR. Previously, Aziz et al. [4] studied the complexity of testing Pareto optimality of a committee.
In this paper, we settle the complexity of testing PJR by proving that the problem is coNP-complete. We complement the complexity result by showing that the problem admits efficient algorithms if any of the following parameters are bounded: (1) n (number of voters) (2) m (number of candidates) (3) a (maximum number of candidates approved by a voter) (4) d (maximum number of voters approving a given candidate). For the first two parameters, we show that the problem is FPT (fixed-parameter tractable), i.e, there exists an FPT algorithm that solves the problem in f (k) · poly(|I|) time, where where k is the parameter and f is some computable function and poly is a polynomial both independent of problem instance I.
Our results are summarized in Table 1 .
Parameter
Complexity Reference 
Approval-based Committee Voting and Representation Properties
We consider a social choice setting with a set N = {1, . . . , n} of voters and a set C of m candidates. Each voter i ∈ N submits an approval ballot A i ⊆ C, which represents the subset of candidates that she approves of. We refer to the list A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of approval ballots as the ballot profile. We will consider approval-based multi-winner voting rules that take as input a tuple (N, C, A, k), where k is a positive integer that satisfies k ≤ m, and return a subset W ⊆ C of size k, which we call the winning set, or committee.
We now summarize the main representation properties proposed in the literature.
Definition 1 (Justified representation (JR)). Given a ballot profile
. . , A n ) over a candidate set C and a target committee size k, we say that a set of candidates W of size |W | = k provides justified representation for ( A, k) if
The rationale behind this definition is that if k candidates are to be selected, then, intuitively, each group of n k voters "deserves" a representative. Therefore, a set of n k voters that have at least one candidate in common should not be completely unrepresented.
Definition 2 (Extended justified representation (EJR)). Given a ballot profile
We say that W satisfies satisfies extended justified representation for ( A, k) if it satisfies satisfies ℓ-extended justified representation for ( A, k) and all integers ℓ ≤ k.
Sánchez-Fernández et al. [11] came up with the notion of proportional justified representation (PJR), which can be seen as an alternative to EJR. Definition 3 (Proportional Justified Representation (PJR)). Given a ballot profile (A 1 , . . . , A n ) over a candidate set C, a target committee size k, k ≤ m, and integer ℓ we say that a set of candidates W , |W | = k, satisfies ℓ-proportional justified representation for ( A, k) if
We say that W satisfies satisfies proportional justified representation for ( A, k) if it satisfies satisfies ℓ-proportional justified representation for ( A, k) and all integers ℓ ≤ k.
It is easy to observe that EJR implies PJR which implies JR.
Results
We first prove that testing PJR is coNP-complete. The proof involves a similar type of reduction as the one used by Aziz et al. [1, 2] to prove that testing EJR is coNP-complete. Proof. It is easy to see that this problem is in coNP. A set of voters X ⊂ N such that |X| ≥ ℓ n k , | ∩ i∈X A i | ≥ ℓ and |W ∩ (∪ i∈X A i )| ≥ ℓ) is a certificate that W does not satisfy PJR.
To prove coNP-completeness, we reduce the classic Balanced Biclique problem ([GT24] in Garey and Johnson 1979) to the complement of our problem. An instance of Balanced Biclique is given by a bipartite graph (L, R, E) with parts L and R and edge set E, and an integer ℓ; it is a "yes"-instance if we can pick subsets of vertices
otherwise, it is a "no"-instance. Given an instance (L, R, E), ℓ of Balanced Biclique with R = {v 1 , . . . , v s }, we create an instance of our problem as follows. Assume without loss of generality that s ≥ 3, ℓ ≥ 3. We construct 3 pairwise disjoint sets of candidates C 0 , C 1 and C 2 , so that C 0 = L, |C 1 | = ℓ − 1, |C 2 | = sℓ + ℓ − 3s + (ℓ − 2), and set C = C 0 ∪ C 1 ∪ C 2 . We then construct 3 sets of voters N 0 , N 1 , N 2 , so that N 0 = {1, . . . , s}, |N 1 | = ℓ(s − 1) + ℓ, |N 2 | = sℓ + ℓ − 3s + (ℓ − 2) (note that |N 2 | ≥ (ℓ − 1) as we assume that ℓ ≥ 3). For each i ∈ N 0 we set A i = {u j | (u j , v i ) ∈ E}, and for each i ∈ N 1 we set A i = C 0 ∪ C 1 . The candidates in C 2 are matched to voters in N 2 : each voter in N 2 approves exactly one candidate in C 2 , and each candidate in C 2 is approved by exactly one voter in N 2 . Denote the resulting list of ballots by A. Finally, we set k = 2ℓ − 2, and let W = C 1 ∪ X, where X is a subset of C 2 with |X| = ℓ − 1. Note that the number of voters n is given by s + ℓ(s − 1) + ℓ + sℓ + ℓ − 3s + (ℓ − 2) = 2(s + 1)(ℓ − 1), so n k = s + 1. Suppose first that we started with a "yes"-instance of Balanced Biclique, and let (L ′ , R ′ ) be the respective ℓ-by-ℓ biclique. Let C * = L ′ and N * = R ′ ∪N 1 . Then |N * | = ℓ(s + 1) = ℓ n k , all voters in N * approve all candidates in C * , |C * | = ℓ, but all voters in N * together are only represented by ℓ − 1 candidates in W . Hence, W fails to provide ℓ-proportional justified representation for ( A, k).
Conversely, suppose that W fails to provide PJR for ( A, k). That is, there exists a value j > 0, a set N * of j(s + 1) voters and a set C * of j candidates so that all voters in N * approve of all candidates in C * , but all voters in N * Note that although there is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a committee that achieves PJR [12] , we have proved that checking whether any arbitrary committee achieves PJR is coNP-complete. We complement the negative computational result by showing that testing PJR is computationally tractable if one of the following parameters is bounded.
• m = |C|
• n = |N | • a = max i∈N |A i | (maximum size of approval sets).
• d = max c∈C |{i ∈ N : c ∈ A i }| (maximum number of approvals of an alternative).
We first observe that testing PJR is in FPT with parameter n.
Theorem 2. Testing PJR is in FPT with parameter n and takes time at most
Proof. Suppose we want to check whether W ⊂ C satisfies PJR. If n is bounded then one can simply brute force all the possible violating sets X ⊆ N of voters and check that if |X| ≥ ℓ n k and | ∩ i∈X A i | ≥ ℓ then it must be that |W ∩ (∪ i∈X A i )| ≥ ℓ.
Next, we prove that testing PJR is in FPT with parameter m. Proof. Suppose we want to check whether W ⊂ C satisfies PJR. Note that it is sufficient to show that testing ℓ-PJR is in FPT with parameter m. Note that ℓ ≤ |X|k/n for all X ⊂ N . Since |X| ≤ n, ℓ ≤ k ≤ m. We go through all the subsets S ∈ 2 C of size ℓ. Each set S is viewed as the intersection of possible objecting/deviating set of voters. For each S, we find the corresponding set of voters X S as follows:
We return no (i.e., W does not satisfy ℓ-
If we do not return no for any S, in that case we return yes (i.e., W satisfies ℓ-PJR).
We now argue that it takes at most O(2 m m 3 n) operations to test PJR. To check ℓ-PJR, we go through 2 m sets. For each set S, we find X S which takes m 2 n steps. After that we find ∪ i∈X A i which takes an additional mn operations. Hence it takes O(2 m m 2 n) operations to test ℓ-PJR and it takes O(2 m m 3 n) operations to test PJR.
If a = max i∈N |A i | is bounded, then PJR can be tested in polynomial time.
Theorem 4. If a is bounded, testing PJR is solvable in polynomial time
Proof. Suppose we want to check whether W ⊂ C satisfies PJR. Note that it is sufficient to show that testing ℓ-PJR is polynomial-time solvable for each ℓ if a is bounded. Note that we only need to consider ℓ ≤ a because the maximum size of intersection of any set of approval sets is at most a which means that | ∩ i∈X A i | ≤ a. For ℓ larger than a, ℓ-PJR is trivially satisfied. We now describe the algorithm to test ℓ-PJR for all ℓ ≤ a. We go through all the subsets S ∈ 2 C of size ℓ ≤ a. There are at most m ℓ = m! (m−ℓ)!(ℓ)! such sets. Since ℓ ≤ a and a is bounded, it implies that a is constant as well and hence there at most m a different subsets to be considered. Each set S is viewed as the intersection of possible objecting /deviating set of voters. For each S, we find the corresponding set of voters X S as follows:
We now argue that it takes at most O(m a m 3 n) operations to test PJR. To check ℓ-PJR, we go through at most m a sets. For each set S, we find X S which takes m 2 n steps. After that we find ∪ i∈X A i which takes an additional mn operations. Hence it takes O(m a m 2 n) operations to test ℓ-PJR and it takes O(m a+1 m 2 n) operations to test PJR.
Finally, we show that if d = max c∈C |{i ∈ N : c ∈ A i }| is bounded, then PJR can be tested in polynomial time.
Theorem 5. If d is bounded, testing PJR is solvable in polynomial time
Proof. Suppose we want to check whether W ⊂ C satisfies PJR. Note that for any deviating/objecting set of voters X, | ∩ i∈X A i | ≤ d. The reason is that any candidate c is approved by at most d voters. Hence in order to check for a violation of ℓ-PJR, we just need to check for sets of voters of size at most d. There are at most In this paper, we examined the complexity of testing PJR, an interesting new axiom in committee voting. The arguments for all of our positive algorithmic results also hold for testing EJR rather than PJR.
